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Abstract 
Almost all comparative research on the effects of employment protection legislation of regular 
employees (EPLR) is based on the index of the OECD. This study argues that this index is methodo-
logically flawed and proposes a new EPLR index, following a theory-driven formative index con-
struction approach. To demonstrate the implications using the OECD EPLR index versus the new 
index, we use two empirical applications: First, the effects of EPLR on perceived job insecurity, 
using multi-level models with data from the European Social Survey, the European Working Condi-
tion Survey, and the European Quality of Life Survey. Secondly the temporary employment risk for 
new hires, using multi-level models with data from the European Labour Force Survey. Whereas 
the results based on the OECD EPLR index significantly deviate from the hypotheses in the litera-
ture, the results using the new EPLR index is compliant with the hypotheses in the literature. This 
demonstrates higher criterion validity of the theory-driven new EPLR index and also calls for repli-
cations of previous research that is based on the index of the OECD. 
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1 Introduction1 
Previous research on the effects of employment protection legislation on unemployment has led 
to contradictory results. Some studies find employment protection legislation of regular employ-
ees (EPLR) has an increasing effect on overall unemployment (Holt and Hendrickson, 2017; Lazear, 
1990), others find no effect (Addison et al., 2000; Addison and Grosso, 1996; Addison and Teixeira, 
2003; Blanchard and Portugal, 2001; Nickell, 1997; OECD, 2004). Although some studies find that 
EPLR increases youth unemployment (Boeri and Ours, 2013; Breen, 2005; Esping‐Andersen, 2000; 
Heckman and Page, 2000; OECD, 2004, 2006), a replication by Noelke (2016) suggests that these 
results may be an artifact. The discussion about which estimates are to be believed, focuses on the 
research design and statistical analysis techniques (e.g., Checchi and Leonardi, 2016; Noelke, 
2016). A Discussion on the operationalisation of the theoretical concept of EPLR is so far missing 
and all comparative research is based on the OECD EPLR index (OECD, 2013). In this paper, we 
close this blind spot and evaluate this key variable. In all three steps of index construction – choice 
of items, normalization of items, and aggregation – the OECD EPLR index violates key assumptions 
about the latent theoretical construct. We, therefore, propose a new, theory-driven index for EPLR 
constructed with the same OECD items, that solves these methodological flaws. We examine the 
two indices regarding criterion validity and the effect on substantive results using two examples. 
We examine 1) the effect of EPLR on the subjective job security of permanent and temporary em-
ployees and 2) the effect of EPLR on temporary employment risk for new hires. For both examples, 
we find that the proposed indicator leads to theory-compliant results, whereas the OECD EPLR 
index leads to results, that contradict expectations from the literature. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we give an overview over the 
current usage of OECD EPLR index as a measurement of EPLR and discuss its methodological defi-
ciency. In section 3, we lay out the construction of the new indicator for EPLR. In section 4, we test 
the criterion validity of the proposed indicator by applying it to two exemplary research problems. 
In section 5, we conclude our study with a summary of our results and implications for future re-
search. 
                                                                            
1  We want to thank Christof Wolf, Felix Weiss, and the participants of the ISA RC28 Spring Meeting 2019 and 
the GESIS Research Day 2018 for helpful comments. A previous and longer version of this paper was pub-
lished as: Balz, Anne and Pforr, Klaus (2020) Operationalization of employment protection legislation and 
implications for substantive results: Example of perceived job insecurity and temporary employment risk. 
In: Balz, Anne (2020) Causes and consequences of job insecurity in modern societies: temporary employment, 
employment protection legislation and turnover intentions in a comparative perspective. Open Access 
Mannheim [Dissertation]. https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/53498. 
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2 Current usage of the OECD index as an indicator for 
employment protection 
The OECD EPLR index is used in most comparative research on the effects of EPLR. Most recent 
studies (e.g., Baranowska and Gebel, 2010; Gebel and Giesecke, 2011, 2016; Noelke, 2016) include 
it to measure employment protection for regular employees. This operationalization can be con-
sidered as state of the art (Checchi and Leonardi, 2016: 532). Other studies use the OECD EPLR 
index in addition to the OECD sub-indices on regulations on temporary employment and protec-
tion against collective dismissals. Older studies use the OECD overall index2 that calculates a 
weighted average between the EPLR sub-index and the two other sub-indices (Breen, 2005; de 
Lange et al., 2014; Gangl, 2003, 2008). Others use the differences between the sub-indices (Barbieri 
and Cutuli, 2016) or the ratio (Biegert, 2017). All these variations are based on the EPLR sub-index. 
The predominance of the OECD EPLR index is reflected by the wide consensus of what the OECD 
EPLR index is supposed to measure: the protection of permanent employees against dismissal 
(e.g., Barbieri and Cutuli, 2016, p. 503).3 However, so far, only a brief description of the develop-
ment of the index exists (Allard, 2005; Venn, 2009), and a detailed discussion and assessment of its 
validity are missing. The minimal documentation in Allard (2005) and Venn (2009) on the develop-
ment of the OECD index and its sub-indices has significant gaps concerning the theoretical founda-
tion of the index, and the documentation lacks validation studies.  
Although the OECD EPLR index includes a wide range of items related to the dismissal of regular 
employees, it poorly reflects the theoretical construct protection against dismissal, because the 
mapping and scaling of the theoretical sub-dimensions to the items (i.e. normalization, 
Drewnowski, 1974) and the aggregation of the items are not theoretically grounded. The OECD 
EPLR index employs the empirical normalization strategy, i.e. the ranges of the theoretical con-
struct of the sub-dimensions are identical to the empirical realizations of the respective items. 
Therefore, the realized minima and maxima of the sub-dimensions make up the common scale 
among the different subdimension. This means that items, which differentiate only on one end of 
the theoretical construct, are artificially stretched and mask those items that differentiate strong-
ly. Moreover, the OECD EPLR index uses an additive aggregation rule (see Goertz, 2006), which 
implies perfect compensation between the different sub-dimensions. From the theoretical per-
spective, this seems implausible for almost all sub-dimensions. If, for example, a country does not 
impose any restrictions on the grounds for dismissal and the dismissal of permanent employees is 
legally permitted for almost any reason, the consequences in the form of penalties of an unfair 
dismissal are irrelevant, because they will never occur. 
                                                                            
2  The OECD overall index was published under the name “overall strictness of protection against dismissals” 
in the June 1999 Employment Outlook (OECD, 2004). The theoretical construct EPL includes a variety of 
regulations that can be separated into three independent theoretical sub-dimensions: 1) protection of 
regular workers against individual dismissal, 2) specific requirements for collective dismissals, and 3) regu-
lations on temporary employment (OECD, 2014: 1). 
3  In the literature, this also is called “job security provisions” (Noelke, 2016), “regulation of permanent 
work” (Baranowska and Gebel, 2010), “employment protection for regular workers” (Barbieri and Cutuli, 
2016: 503), “employment protection of regular contracts” (Gebel and Giesecke, 2011), or “employment 
protection for regular jobs/of permanent contracts/of permanent work contracts” (Gebel and Giesecke, 
2016). However, commonly and a bit confusingly the term EPL is also often used as a synonym for protec-
tion of regular employees against dismissal, which also is reflected in the name of the original EPL index of 
the OECD, which included all three dimensions and was published under the name overall strictness of 
protection against dismissals. 
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Due to these problems with the normalization rule and the aggregation, the measurement of the 
OECD EPLR index deviates substantially from its theoretical construct. Although already Bertola et 
al. (2000) criticized the validity of the index, they did not offer a solution. In the next section, we lay 
out a new indicator that closes this gap. 
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3 New Indicator for Employment Protection Legislation for 
Regular Employees 
There are two approaches to index construction. With the reflexive index approach, one identifies 
measurable intercorrelated variables that are causally affected by the latent construct. With the 
formative index approach, one identifies measurable variables that are causally generative of the 
latent construct (Edwards, 2011). As in cross-national research, we want to summarize different 
aspects of national legislation into one indicator; therefore, the formative index construction logic 
is more appropriate (Bollen and Lennox, 1991: 306).4 For the formative index approach, we have to 
define the latent construct and its theoretical subdimension. Moreover, we have to determine how 
the sub-dimensions generate the latent construct. Furthermore, we have to specify how the sub-
dimensions are operationalized. Finally, we have to specify how the sub-dimensions together ag-
gregate to the latent construct. 
3.1 Definition of the latent construct EPLR and derivation of the sub-
dimensions 
To determine the sub-dimensions of this latent EPLR construct, we use a theoretical model to 
understand the dismissal process. 
Figure 1   Dismissal Procedure 
 
Source: Own presentation. 
                                                                            
4  Reflexive index construction requires correlation among the item from which the index is constructed 
(Latcheva and Davidov, 2014: 750). As can be seen in Table A1 in the appendix, the items of the OECD EPLR 
index correlate only weakly. 
Stage 4: 
Concequences 
Stage 3: 
 Difficulty of 
an appeal in 
court 
Stage 2: 
 Difficulty of 
a fair 
dismissal 
Stage 1:  
Difficulty of 
a formally 
correct 
notice 
Starting point 
Company 
wants to 
dismiss 
employee 
Form of 
dismissal 
correct 
Dismissal 
fair (reason 
allowed) 
Challenged 
in court Concequences of a "fair" dismissal 
Employee 
accepts Concequences of a "fair" dismissal 
Dismissal 
unfair 
(reason  not  
allowed) 
Challenged 
in court 
Concequences of an "unfair" 
dismissal 
Employee 
accepts Concequences of a "fair" dismissal 
Form of 
dismissal 
not correct 
Challenged 
in court No dismissal 
Employee 
accepts Concequences of a "fair" dismissal 
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Figure 1 shows the flow diagram of the dismissal process. If a company wants to dismiss an em-
ployee (Stage 1), notice must be given. This notice can be valid in form or not (e.g., a verbal notice 
instead of a written notice as required). Therefore, the first factor is the difficulty of formally cor-
rect notice. If the notice is valid in form, the next bar to pass is whether the reason for dismissal is 
legally valid or not (Stage 2), so the second decisive factor is the difficulty of a fair dismissal. In any 
case, the employee can take legal action against the dismissal (Stage 3). Therefore, the difficulty of 
an appeal is the third decisive factor. We assume that in the event of a challenge in court, the 
courts will rule according to the law5. At the end of the dismissal process, the outcomes or conse-
quences are listed (Stages 4). Costs for employers correspond to the benefits for employees and 
vice versa.  
This dismissal procedure model implies that a formative EPLR indicator should include the follow-
ing sub-dimensions: the difficulty of a formally correct notice, the difficulty of a fair dismissal, the 
difficulty of challenging a dismissal in court, and the consequences of a fair or unfair dismissal. To 
operationalize these sub-dimensions, one must determine the measurable factors that determine 
those difficulties. 
3.2 Operationalization of the sub-dimensions of EPLR 
To operationalize these sub-dimensions, we use the legal situation as the starting point. Because 
the OECD also used the legal situation to construct the OECD index  (OECD, 2004) and this coding 
of country laws into items has been proven to be reliable (Noelke, 2016: 22f. Online-Appendix), we 
can use the existing OECD coding (OECD, 2004) to construct the new EPLR index. This offers the 
advantages that our index can be constructed with existing data.  
The first subdimension (Stage 1) is the "difficulty of a formally correct notice". The OECD offers two 
items that influence this dimension: "notification procedures" and "delay to start a notice"6. The 
OECD understands these items as "procedural inconveniences". The items capture the form that a 
valid notice of termination must take and how long employers must wait before notice of termina-
tion can be issued in a valid form. If these restrictions on the form of a notice of termination are 
not complied with, the notice is invalid. The "difficulty of fair dismissal" (Stage 2) can be measured 
by the item "definition of unfair dismissal", which indicates the grounds on which a dismissal is 
legally permissible. Stage 3 refers to how difficult it is for employees to challenge a wrongful ter-
mination in court. There is no coding for this within the EPLR framework of the OECD, because this 
difficulty cannot be derived directly from the law.7 We use collective bargaining coverage8 as a 
proxy. In other contexts, the degree of organization of trade unions has been used as a proxy for 
their influence in society, which also can serve as a proxy for the difficulty to challenge an employ-
ee's unfair dismissal in court. Thus, data on employees' access to union support, legal advice or 
                                                                            
5  This means we do not account for possible grey areas, unsystematic decision error or a bias in favor of 
employees or employers in the legal system of countries. 
6  Delay to start a notice: Estimated time includes, where relevant, the following assumptions: 6 days are 
counted in case of required warning procedure, 1 day when dismissal can be notified orally or the notice 
can be directly handed to the employee, 2 days when a letter needs to be sent by mail and 3 days when 
this must be a registered letter. 
7  During the development of the OECD indicators, a discussion was held as to whether some aspects of the 
legal system such as “burden of proof,” “contested dismissal cases per 1,000 workers,” or “average time 
for a decision in labor cases” should be included (Venn, 2009: 27–47). However, the role of courts was not 
included in the EPLR OECD index which has been criticized afterwards (Bertola et al., 2000: 67–70). 
8  Collective bargaining coverage rate corresponds to the ratio of employees covered by collective agree-
ments divided by all wage earners with a right to bargaining (see OECD, 2019; Visser, 2019). 
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legal support from union lawyers usually are available. Ensuring that employees are aware of their 
rights and helping them to enforce these rights reduces the difficulty to contest an unfair dismissal 
in court. The data on the coverage rate of trade unions also is provided by the OECD (2013). Stage 4 
distinguishes between the consequences of "fair" and "unfair" dismissals. "Notice period" and 
"severance pay" are regarded as the consequences of a fair dismissal, and the two suitable items 
for the consequences of an unfair dismissal are "compensation following an unfair dismissal" and 
the "possibility of reinstatement following an unfair dismissal". 
3.3 Normalization of items 
The items that operationalize the sub-dimensions from the theoretical model have to be normal-
ized, i.e. they have to be transformed to a common scale. Most normalization procedures are 
based on the empirical distribution of the items: e.g., Index of Social Progress (Estes, 1997), and 
Index of Social Health (Miringoff et al., 1999). In rare cases, a theory-driven normalization strategy 
is chosen: e.g. "Level of Living Index" (Drewnowski, 1974) and the "Human Development Index 
(HDI)" (UNDP, 1999). The essential aspect of theory-driven normalization is the definition of the 
"critical points of the indicator," i.e., the survival level and saturation point (Drewnowski, 1974). 
Below the minimum or the survival level, further deterioration is not to be expected, whereas 
above the saturation point, a further increase is not to be expected. Usually, there are no objective 
criteria or unanimous expert opinions to unambiguously determine these critical points 
(Drewnowski, 1974: 22). Whereas empirical standardization usually can be described in one sen-
tence, theoretical standardization requires a comprehensive theoretical explanation (e.g. 
Drewnowski, 1974: 52–68). However, such an approach is particularly important if the empirical 
distribution clusters at one end of the latent subdimension, as is shown in Figure 2.  
Source: Own presentation. 
Figure 2 on the left side shows the distributions of two items. For the upper item, the distribution is 
restricted to the lower end of the theoretical subdimension, whereas the lower item is distributed 
over the entire range of the subdimension. The right side of Figure 2 shows the results of the two 
normalization strategies. Whereas the theory-driven normalization considers the distribution on 
the latent subdimension, the empirical normalization assumes that the empirical maximum equals 
Theory-driven 
normalisation 
Theoretical 
minimum 
Theoretical 
maximum 
Theoretical 
minimum 
Theoretical 
maximum Empirical  
normalisation 
Figure 2  Theory-driven vs empirical normalization 
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the theoretical maximum. Therefore, if an empirical normalization is chosen, the resulting meas-
urement misleadingly suggests a high variance over the entire subdimension, although the meas-
urement does not reflect the range across the construct. If the two items are aggregated, the vari-
ance of the upper item is artificially inflated relative to the lower item. Although a theory-based 
normalization is not empirically verifiable, this approach improves the correspondence of the 
measurement with the underlying latent subdimension. 
For the new EPLR index, we follow a theoretical approach. The mappings of the original coding 
and the critical points (survival level and saturation point) are explained below and summarized in 
Table 1. The column ‘new coding’ shows the proposed theoretical normalization on the basis of 
the defined theoretical minima and maxima. 
Table 1  Normalization assumptions for new EPLR index 
Theoretical subdi-
mensiong 
Iteme Original 
coding 
Value label Critical 
points 
New 
coding 
Stage 1: Difficulty of a 
formally correct no-
tice of termination 
Item 1: Notifica-
tion Procedures 
0 An oral statement is enough  0 
2 A written statement of the 
reasons for dismissal must be 
supplied to the employee 
 0 
4 A third party (such as works 
council or the competent labor 
authority) must be notified 
 0 
6 The employer cannot proceed 
to dismissal without authoriza-
tion from a third party 
Survival 
level 
0 
Item 2: Delay 
involved before 
notice can starta 
0 ≤ 2 days  0 
1 < 10 days  0 
2 < 18 days  0 
3 < 26 days  0 
4 < 35 days  0 
5 < 45 days  0 
6 ≥ 45 days Survival 
level 
0 
Stage 2: Difficulty of 
fair dismissal  
Item 5: Definition 
of justified or 
unfair dismissal 
0 When worker capability or 
redundancy of the job are ade-
quate and sufficient ground for 
dismissal 
Survival 
level 
0 
2 When social considerations, 
age or job tenure must when 
possible influence the choice of 
which worker(s) to dismiss 
 2 
4 When a transfer and/or a re-
training to adapt the worker to 
different work must be at-
tempted prior to dismissal 
 4 
6 When worker capability cannot 
be a ground for dismissal 
Saturation 
point 
6 
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Stage 3: Difficulty of an 
appeal 
Item 9: Maximum time to make a 
claim of unfair dismissald 
0 Before dismissal 
takes effect 
 0 
1 ≤ 1 month  0 
2 ≤ 3 months  0 
3 ≤ 6 months  0 
4 ≤ 9 months  0 
5 ≤ 12 months  0 
6 > 12 months Survival level 0 
Additional Itemf: Collective bargain-
ing coverage (in percentage) 
0 0 Survival level 0 
… …  … 
6 100 Saturation 
point 
6 
Stage 4: Consequences 
of dismissal 
Item 3a: Length of the notice period 
at 9 months tenure 
0 0 months  0 
1 ≤ 0.4 months  0 
2 ≤ 0.8 months  0 
3 ≤ 1.2 months  0 
4 < 1.6 months  0 
5 < 2 months  0 
6 ≥ 2 months Survival level 0 
Item 3b: Length of the notice period 
at 4 years tenure 
0 0 months  0 
1 ≤ 0.75 months  0 
2 ≤ 1.25 months  0 
3 ≤ 2 months  0 
4 < 2.5 months  0 
5 < 3.5 months  0 
6 ≥ 6 months Survival level 0 
Item 3c: Length of the notice period 
at 20 years tenure 
0 < 1 months  0 
1 ≤ 2.75 months  0 
2 ≤ 5 months  0 
3 ≤ 7 months  0 
4 < 9 months  0 
5 < 11 months  0 
6 ≥ 11 months Survival level 0 
 Item 4a: Severance pay at 9 months 
tenure (in months pay) 
0 0  0 
 1 ≤ 0.5  0 
 2 ≤ 1  0 
 3 ≤ 1.75  0 
 4 ≤ 2.5  0 
 5 < 3  0 
 6 ≥ 3 Survival level 0 
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Stage 4: Consequences 
of dismissal (cont.) 
 Item 4b: Severance pay at 4 
years tenure (in months pay) 
0 0  0 
  1 ≤ 0.5  0 
  2 ≤ 1  0 
  3 ≤ 2  0 
  4 ≤ 3  0 
  5 < 4  0 
  6 ≥ 4 Survival 
level 
0 
  Item 4c: Severance pay at 20 
years tenure (in months pay) 
0 0  0 
  1 ≤ 3  0 
  2 ≤ 6  0 
  3 ≤ 10  0 
  4 ≤ 12  0 
  5 < 18  0 
  6 ≥ 18 Survival 
level 
0 
  Item 7: Compensation follow-
ing unfair dismissal (in months 
pay)  
0 ≤ 3 Survival 
level 
0 
  1 ≤ 8  1 
  2 ≤ 12  2 
  3 ≤ 18  3 
  4 ≤ 24  4 
  5 ≤ 30  5 
  6 > 30 Saturation 
point 
6 
  Item 8: Possibility of reinstate-
ment following unfair dismissal 
0 No right or practice of 
reinstatement 
Survival 
level 
0 
  2 Reinstatement rarely or 
sometimes made available 
 2 
  4 Reinstatement fairly often 
made available 
 4 
  6 Reinstatement (almost) 
always made available 
Saturation 
point 
6 
Note: a Source: authors consideration; 
b Source: OECD (2014); 
c Estimated time includes, where relevant, the following assumptions: 6 days are counted in case of required 
warning procedure, 1 day when dismissal can be notified orally, or the notice can be directly handed to the 
employee, 2 days when a letter needs to be sent by mail and 3 days when this must be a registered letter; 
d Maximum time period after dismissal notification up to which an unfair dismissal claim can be made;  
e Not included in the OECD EPLR index. Source: OECD (2019); 
f Typical compensation at 20 years of tenure, including back pay and other compensation (e.g. for future lost 
earnings in lieu of reinstatement or psychological injury), but excluding ordinary severance pay. 
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Stage 1: Difficulty of formally correct notice of termination 
The measurement of the subdimension "difficulty of formally correct dismissal notice of termina-
tion" indicates the difficulty of giving formal notice of dismissal on a continuum from very easy to 
extremely difficult. The zero point represents "very easy". The saturation point is reached when 
the legally required form of dismissal is so difficult to comply with that it represents a major obsta-
cle for the employer. We consider the requirement of the consent of an employee-friendly third 
party—that has a high tendency of refusal of consent—to be a major obstacle for an employer to 
comply with the requirements of a formal notice of dismissal. If an employer can comply with the 
process easily, the survival level is reached. As shown in Table 1, the original coding differentiates 
only at the lower end of the scale. Although code 4 and 6 refer to a third party, unfortunately, the 
coding does not distinguish between employee-friendly and employer-friendly third parties. How-
ever, in the 800 country years currently available, only Portugal in 1985–1989 and Venezuela in 
2014 take the value 6. Thus, considering that almost without exception, employers must only noti-
fy a third party, it can be assumed that this is not an obstacle to dismissal, this item is irrelevant. 
The saturation level is close to the empirical maximum, i.e. lower levels are substantively equiva-
lent, which means that this item has practically no variance. 
The second item measures the "delay involved before notice can start". We consider this as an 
obstacle if the dismissal becomes cost-ineffective. In this case, a theory-based normalization can 
be based on the average tenure. The maximum value represents a delay of 45 days, which the 
employer has to wait to give formally correct notice of termination. This is not an obstacle, be-
cause this period is negligibly short in comparison to the average length of service. Again, the satu-
ration level is close to the maximum, i.e. lower levels are substantively equivalent. Therefore, we 
assume that the required form of notice does not play a role in the protection of employees 
against dismissal. 
Stage 2: Difficulty in finding a legally permissible ground for dismissal 
The subdimension "difficulty in finding a legally permissible ground for dismissal" is captured with 
the item "definition of unfair dismissal". It measures the reasons for dismissal that can be given, so 
the dismissal will not be overturned in court. We define lack of performance as a sufficient reason 
for giving notice as the survival level. More liberal legislation does not change the situation. The 
saturation point is reached if notice can only be given if an employee cannot fill any other position 
in the company, even after extensive retraining, i.e. more restrictive regulation is essentially 
equivalent. 
Stage 3: Difficulty of appealing a dismissal in court 
The items for the OECD index do not include a measurement for the subdimension "difficulty of an 
appeal", which should measure the difficulty of employees to challenge a formally incorrect or 
legally inadmissible notice in court. We use "collective bargaining coverage rate in %" as a proxy. 
We define 0% as the survival level and 100% as the saturation point. We rescale these values to 0 to 
6. 
Stage 4: Consequences of dismissal  
The subdimension "consequences of dismissal" is measured with "notice period" and "severance 
pay" if the outcome is fair dismissal. For both items, there are three versions depending on tenure 
length. Considering average tenure length, for all three versions of the "notice period" items, we 
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define the maximum level as the survival level. For short tenure, the maximum notice period is still 
so short that it should not affect the dismissal decision considering the opportunity costs. Alt-
hough for a longer tenure, the maximum might be high enough to hurt economically, averaging 
over the tenure of the entire workforce, higher costs of dismissal are weighted down. The same 
argument holds for "severance pay ". We consider the severance pay, even in the worst-case too 
low, to affect the dismissal decision considering the opportunity costs. Therefore, we define the 
survival level as the maximum. 
The subdimension "consequences of dismissal" for unfair dismissal is measured by items "practice 
of reinstatement" and "compensation following unfair dismissal (excluding severance pay)". Be-
cause reinstatement is offered almost never in the minimum, and almost always in the maximum, 
we define the survival level as the minimum and the saturation point as the maximum. For "com-
pensation following unfair dismissal", we do not see a survival level or a saturation point within 
the range of the original scale, and therefore assume the minimum as the survival point and the 
maximum as the saturation point. 
Our conceptual reasoning on the relation between the theoretical sub-dimensions and the OECD 
items reveals the second problem with the OECD EPLR index. The majority of the included items 
differentiate only at the lower end of the theoretical dimension. However, because all items in the 
OECD EPLR index are empirically normalized, the variance of the items that differentiate across the 
entire theoretical dimension is deflated by the artificially stretched items. The proposed indicator 
only includes the items for the sub-dimensions "difficulty of fair dismissal", "difficulty of an ap-
peal", and "consequences of unfair dismissal". 
3.4 Aggregation 
In the next step, we define how the normalized indicators are aggregated to the new EPLR index. 
The essential aspect of the aggregation rule is the assumption which indicators are complements 
or substitutes (Goertz, 2006: 46; Noll, 2002; OECD, 2008: 33; Scheuch and Zehnpfenning, 1989: 171). 
If indicatory are complements, we also have to define the zero point. Additive aggregation as-
sumes substitutability, multiplicative (e.g. Joint Democracy index, Lemke and Reed, 2001), or oth-
er nonlinear rules imply a complementary relationship. Figure 3 shows a minimum, a multiplica-
tive and with "mean" an additive aggregation of the dimensions X and Y to Z. 
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Figure 3  Compensation for different aggregation rules 
 
Note: Own presentation. 
The process model shown in Figure 1 implies complementary relationships between the indicators 
that belong to the different subdimension at the individual stages. More specifically, when a fair 
dismissal is legally possible for any reason, or if an unfair dismissal has no consequences or cannot 
be brought to court, protection against dismissal, regardless of the other dimensions, does not 
exist. Therefore, the overall indicator should equal zero if one of the three dimensions equals zero. 
If, on the other hand, unfair dismissals always are overturned in court, the legislation concerning 
reasons for fair dismissals becomes very important, which implies a multiplicative combination of 
the dimensions with previously defined zero-points. Note that this substitution logic is violated by 
the aggregation rule of the OECD EPLR index, which constitutes the third major problem that our 
proposed EPLR index addresses. 
For the new EPLR index, we use the geometric mean as the aggregation rule. Within the sub-
dimensions, we assume that the items are perfect substitutes, i.e. to measure the "consequences 
of unfair dismissal", we use the arithmetic mean of items 7 and 8. This approach results in the 
following Equation 1 for the proposed indicator: 
Equation 1 EPLR index 
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4 Empirical test – Validity and substantive implications 
Because we use a formative index construction approach, we cannot test the underlying assump-
tions of the index construction by analyzing the distribution and correlation of items. However, we 
can test the criterion validity of our proposed indicator in comparison to the OECD index. There-
fore, we apply our index to the estimation of two exemplary effects discussed in the literature on 
the effects of EPLR. The first example is the effect of EPLR on the subjective job security of employ-
ees in permanent and temporary jobs (Berglund, 2015; Bryan and Jenkins, 2016; Chung, 2016; 
Chung and van Oorschot, 2011; Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2009). The second example is the effect of 
EPLR on temporary employment risk for new hires (de Lange et al., 2014; Gebel and Giesecke, 
2016), which also relates to the research on EPLR on labour market opportunities of young people 
(e.g. Breen, 2005; Esping‐Andersen, 2000; Heckman and Page, 2000; Noelke, 2016; OECD, 2004, 
2006). 
A necessary condition for differences in the effects of EPLR depending on the measurement is a 
difference in the distributions of the OECD index and the proposed index. Kernel density estima-
tors of the OECD EPLR index and the proposed EPLR index (see Figure A1 in the Appendix) show 
that the new EPLR index is bi-modally distributed, whereas the OECD EPLR index is unimodal and 
approximately normally distributed. Consequently, the descriptive findings of the proposed distri-
butions of the latent construct between countries differ considerably. The new EPLR index indi-
cates a polarization of the underlying theoretical dimension, which would be masked if the OECD 
EPLR index is used. The mean of the new EPLR index is 2, with a standard deviation of 1.8. The 
OECD EPLR index has a mean of 2.3, with a standard deviation of 0.7. The correlation between the 
indices is 0.67. 
To test criterion validity, we have to minimize interfering factors that could bias the substantive 
effects. Therefore, we need a close causal link between the latent construct and the effect. Moreo-
ver, the research design has to be suitable for discovering causal connections. Thus, a fixed-effects 
approach would be an ideal research design. However, because both operationalizations of EPLR 
show minimal intra-country variation over time (see Figure A2 in the Appendix), country fixed-
effect models cannot be used for the empirical tests. Therefore, empirical tests are restricted to 
cross-country comparisons, with all the associated causality problems, including omitted varia-
bles at the country level. To minimize causality problems, we investigate only those effects that 
are linked directly to the construct EPLR, and control for all confounding variables. 
4.1 Effect of EPLR on subjective job security 
For the first criterion validity test, we examine the effect of EPLR on subjective job security. Accord-
ing to the theoretical construct, EPLR protects permanent employees against dismissal. According 
to the literature, this should be reflected in the subjective evaluation of both permanent and tem-
porary employees (Balz, 2017; Berglund, 2015; Chung, 2016; Chung and van Oorschot, 2011; Clark 
and Postel-Vinay, 2009), which propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1.1: Stricter EPLR increases the subjective job security of permanent employees. 
Hypothesis 1.2: Stricter EPLR decreases the subjective job security of temporary employees. 
From these hypotheses follows: 
Hypothesis 1.3: Stricter EPLR increases the difference in subjective job security between perma-
nent and temporary employees. 
18 GESIS Papers  2020|19 
Although previous research agrees on these hypotheses, the empirical evidence is mixed (Balz, 
2017; Berglund, 2015; Chung, 2016; Chung and van Oorschot, 2011; Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2009). 
Studies that use the OECD EPLR index find the expected effects described in the literature only if, 
despite an interaction effect, they incorrectly do not include a random slope (Bryan and Jenkins, 
2016). When the models include a random slope, the expected effects are no longer significant 
(Chung, 2016). Given the discrepancy between the consensus regarding the hypothesis and the 
mixed empirical evidence, we consider this to be an ideal candidate for evaluating the two indices. 
Data and Methods 
For the validity test, we use the data from the European Social Survey (ESS) 2004 and 2010; Euro-
pean Working Condition Survey (EWCS) 2005, 2010, and 2015; and European Quality of Life Survey 
(EQLS) 2007, 2012, and 2016. Based on these data sets, we estimate a linear multi-level regression 
model on subjective job security. The dependent variable "subjective job security" is scaled from 1 
to 4 in the ESS, and 1 to 5 in the EWCS and the EQLS. The first level in the multi-level model is em-
ployees aged 20–67. The second level is country-years. At the country level, we control for regula-
tions of temporary contracts and the unemployment rate. At the individual level, the included 
control variables differ across the datasets. Depending on the variables available, we control for 
company size, industry sector, working hours, general and company-specific human capital, gen-
der, and age. For summary statistics for the variables included in the models, see Tables A2–A4 in 
the Appendix. 
Results 
Figure 4 shows the results for the multi-level models. The figures show the predicted levels of per-
ceived job insecurity for permanent and temporary employees, depending on EPLR. The line with 
the dark grey confidence interval indicates permanent employees. The line with light grey confi-
dence intervals corresponds to temporary employees. Additionally, the estimated coefficients are 
shown, i.e., the predicted effect of EPLR on the subjective job security of permanent employees 
and the predicted difference of the effect of EPLR for permanent and temporary employees. For 
the complete results, including control variables, see Tables A5–A7 in the Appendix. 
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Figure 4  Effects of EPLR on subjective job security 
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With the new EPLR index, we mainly find the expected effects. With the EWCS and EQLS data, we 
find that protection against dismissal increases the perceived job security of permanent employ-
ees. We find with all three data sets that the effect of protection against dismissal is stronger for 
permanent employees than temporary employees. In contrast, when using the OECD EPLR index, 
the empirical findings contradict the theoretical expectations across all three datasets. Here, we 
find that protection against dismissal measured with the OECD EPLR index reduces the perceived 
job security of permanent employees. Therefore, the OECD EPLR index does not capture the differ-
ent effects of employment protection on temporary and permanent employees. When the OECD 
operationalization is used, the interaction effect is not significant in any of the three data sets.  
4.2 Effect of EPLR on temporary employment risk for new hires 
For the second criterion validity test, we refer to the literature on labor market participation of 
young adults. The literature generally assumes that strict EPLR has a negative impact on the labor 
market opportunities of young people (e.g. Breen, 2005; Gebel and Giesecke, 2016; Noelke, 2016), 
because it increases unemployment risk (Breen, 2005; Esping‐Andersen, 2000; Heckman and Page, 
2000; OECD, 2004, 2006) and temporary employment risk of labor market entrants risks (de Lange 
et al., 2014; Gebel and Giesecke, 2016). However, the findings are ambiguous. Although most em-
pirical findings have suggested that EPLR increases youth unemployment, a replication of previous 
findings has found that these results are unstable and may be an artifact (Noelke, 2016). 
Nevertheless, some theoretical expectations are consistent. According to the literature (e.g. Gebel 
and Giesecke, 2016: 488), the effect of EPLR or protection against dismissal on the youth unem-
ployment and temporary employment rates is caused by the hiring strategies of companies. Thus, 
to reduce the influence of uncontrolled variables at the country level, we used the effect on hiring 
behavior to examine the construct validity of the two indices.9 
Following Gebel and Giesecke (2016), we identified hypotheses to use for the criterion validity test. 
High protection against dismissal should lead to lower hiring and dismissal rates, and increase 
incentives to use fixed-term contracts. Thus, stricter EPLR or job security provisions should not 
reduce the number of new hires in general, but rather the number of permanent hires. This expec-
tation applies to both entrants to the labor market and labor market outsiders (the unemployed), 
which leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2.1: Stricter EPLR increases the risk for labor market new hires to receive a temporary 
(versus permanent) contract. 
An advantage of this hypothesis is that it implicitly controls for current hiring rates in each country 
by comparing temporary to permanent contracts. 
Data and Methods 
We use the years 1992-2013 from the 2017 release of the EU labor force survey (EU-LFS) data. The 
analysis sample is restricted to new contracts for employees aged 18–68. New contracts are de-
                                                                            
9  Many of the effects studied in the literature are not directly caused by the latent construct protection 
against dismissal (e.g., youth unemployment rate, fixed-term employment rate for young people) but 
transmitted through other variables. It is not possible to control all the relevant confounding variables 
(e.g., the education system) and therefore these questions are not suitable as a test of criterion validity. 
Moreover, because the low variation of EPLR across time rules out fixed-effect models that could control 
for many confounding variables, a close link in the causal chain is crucial. 
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fined as all new employment contracts of employees who were not employed in the previous year 
and are not on parental leave, i.e., are unemployed or still in the education system. The dependent 
variable is a dummy indicating temporary vs. permanent contracts. We exclude fixed-term appren-
ticeship contracts from the sample. We used a linear multi-level model with new contracts as level 
1 and country-years as level 2. We control for the duration of the trial period, unemployment rate, 
regulations on the use of temporary contracts, and years at the country level; and for age, gender, 
and level of education at the individual level. We use 304 country-years for our analysis. Figure A3 
shows the temporary employment rate for new hires across countries. Each dot represents one 
country-year. The mean temporary employment rate for new hires is 44%, with a standard devia-
tion of 20, the minimum is 10%, and the maximum is 89%. Poland, Portugal, and Spain have par-
ticularly high values (greater than 80%), whereas Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Switzerland, and the 
United Kingdom have low values (less than 20%). As the new EPLR index and the OECD EPLR index 
have different variances, as can be seen in Figure A1, we also z-standardize both indices to take 
into account the effects of the differences in the variances on the effect sizes.  
Results 
The results of the multi-level regression presented in Table 2 show the effects of EPLR and the 
duration of the trial period on temporary employment risk for new contracts. See Table A8 for a 
complete regression table, including all control variables. 
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Table 2  Effect of EPLR on temporary employment risk of new hires 
 New EPLR index OECD EPLR index New EPLR index 
(z-stnd.) 
OECD EPLR index (z-
stnd.) 
 beta se beta se beta se beta se 
New EPLR index 0.032** (0.005)       
OECD EPLR index   0.111** (0.012)     
New EPLR index (z-stnd.)     0.057** (0.009)   
OECD EPLR index (z-stnd.)       0.064** (0.007) 
Duration of trial period (short) 0.074** (0.020) 0.026 (0.020) 0.074** (0.020) 0.026 (0.020) 
Regulations on the use of temporary contracts -0.007 (0.006) 0.003 (0.005) -0.007 (0.006) 0.003 (0.005) 
Unemployment rate 0.022** (0.002) 0.025** (0.002) 0.022** (0.002) 0.025** (0.002) 
Variance components         
Individual 0.207 (0.000) 0.207 (0.000) 0.207 (0.000) 0.207 (0.000) 
Country 0.023 (0.002) 0.020 (0.002) 0.023 (0.002) 0.020 (0.002) 
R2 Individual 0.069  0.081  0.069  0.081  
R2 Country 0.410  0.485  0.410  0.485  
Country-years 304  304  304  304  
Individuals 1242199  1242199  1242199  1242199  
Note: + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01; Standard errors in parentheses. R-squared as proposed by Snijders and Bosker (1994, pp. 350–354; 1999, pp. 99–105).  
Source: EU-LFS 1992-2003, 2017 release; Estimations from the random intercept model; Restricted Maximum Likelihood. 
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Both operationalizations of EPLR support the hypothesis that the temporary employment risk of 
new hires increases with stronger protection against dismissal. At first glance, the proposed EPLR 
index seems to have no benefit. The effect size for the OECD EPLR index is even larger. However, 
the difference in the coefficients follows from the distribution differences between the two indices. 
If both EPLR indices are z-standardized, the effects are similarly large. An increase of the OECD 
EPLR index by one standard deviation increases the temporary employment risk by 6.4 percentage 
points and by 5.7 percentage points for the respective increase of the new EPLR index (see Table 
2).10 
The key difference between the two indices is that with the new EPLR index, a shorter legal trial 
period also significantly increases the temporary employment risk of new hires. This effect reflects 
the expectations in the literature (e.g. Gebel and Giesecke, 2011), where fixed-term employment is 
expected to be used as an extended probationary period or screening device (Korpi and Levin, 
2001). The incentive to use fixed-term contracts as a prolonged trial period should increase if the 
legal trial period is short. This effect cannot be found by the model using the OECD EPLR index 
because the trial period effect is partly confounded with the EPLR effect, because the item is part 
of the OECD EPLR index. Therefore, although the OECD EPLR index also leads to the expected ef-
fects of temporary employment risk for new hires, only with the new EPLR index we can validly 
estimate the effects of the related concepts, which are hidden when using the OECD EPLR index. 
                                                                            
10  The z-standardization should not be confused with the empirical normalization discussed in section 3.3. 
With the z-standardization of the index, the coefficient of the valid index is adjusted to the empirical distri-
bution, whereas the empirical normalization leads to an invalid index. 
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5 Conclusion 
Employment protection legislation of regular employees is a key variable in labor market research. 
In this study, we 1) argue that the OECD operationalization violates several theoretical assump-
tions, 2) propose a new EPLR index that solves the deficiencies of the OECD index, 3) demonstrate 
with empirical analyses, that findings are crucially different when using the proposed EPLR index, 
and 4) show that the proposed EPLR index) has higher criterion validity, because it better corre-
sponds to the predictions of theory. 
So far, comparative research has used the OECD EPLR index for operationalizing employment 
protection for regular employees without thorough methodological reflection. We close this gap 
by constructing and testing an alternative theory-driven EPLR index. Starting with the latent theo-
retical construct of EPLR, we develop an alternative measurement in accordance with the princi-
ples of index construction. Based on a broad empirical foundation using four cross-country da-
tasets—ESS, EQLS, EWCS, and EU-LFS—we show that our theory-driven EPLR index generates sig-
nificantly different results than the OECD EPLR index, and that it has a higher criterion validity. For 
both the effects of EPLR on perceived job security and on temporary employment risk for new 
hires, we find the effects predicted in the literature. In contrast, the results from the OECD EPLR 
index contradict the hypotheses in the literature. Most noteworthy, we find that–opposite to theo-
retical expectation–strict job security provisions measured with the OECD EPLR index reduce per-
ceived job security for permanent employees. With the new EPLR index, we come to results in line 
with theory. Moreover, we find in accordance with Korpi and Levin (2001) and Gebel and Giesecke 
(2016) that with the new EPLR index that in countries with a short probation period, the temporary 
employment risk for new hires is higher. This effect does not show with the OECD EPLR index. 
Besides the substantive implications for comparative labor market research, the second contribu-
tion of our study is methodological. Even though the call for a theory-driven index construction 
has existed for a long time in the index construction literature (e.g. Blalock, 1982; Noll, 2002), it has 
almost never been implemented consistently. This study is a showcase example of a successful 
implementation of theory-driven index construction. 
Our proposed EPLR index is based on several debatable assumptions. For the normalization as-
sumptions, it would be desirable to identify the saturation and survival levels with respect to the 
items more precisely. The saturation levels are especially difficult to determine exactly, so refining 
and empirically testing the proposed threshold could improve the measurement. Another point of 
possible improvement could be the proxy chosen for the difficulty to challenge a dismissal in 
court. A detailed analysis of the procedural regulations of a country, the rules on court costs, and 
the degree to which legal expense insurances are spread might lead to better measurement. The 
advantage of our approach, however, is that all the coded indicators we use are readily available. 
Considering that most previous research has been based on the OECD EPLR index, a replication of 
key research findings is imperative for a fact-based policy debate about employment protection 
legislation. Moreover, in the social sciences, all indicators should be constructed with more theory-
driven reflection in the normalization and aggregation steps. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 Correlation structure of the EPLR items coded by the OECD 
 
Item  
1 
Item  
2 
Item  
3a 
Item  
3b 
Item  
3c 
Item  
4a 
Item  
4b 
Item  
4c 
Item  
5 
Item  
6 
Item  
7 
Item  
8 
Item 1 1.00 
           Item 2 0.50 1.00 
          Item 3a 0.14 0.30 1.00 
         Item 3b 0.18 0.32 0.76 1.00 
        Item 3c 0.06 0.24 0.47 0.51 1.00 
       Item 4a 0.13 0.13 0.28 0.09 -0.26 1.00 
      Item 4b 0.20 -0.11 -0.14 -0.13 -0.46 0.61 1.00 
     Item 4c 0.31 -0.05 -0.08 -0.05 -0.34 0.48 0.90 1.00 
    Item 5 0.38 0.26 0.01 -0.14 -0.13 0.30 0.14 0.05 1.00 
   Item 6 0.01 0.08 0.13 -0.02 -0.31 0.30 0.29 0.14 0.19 1.00 
  Item 7 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.08 0.09 0.53 -0.02 1.00 
 Item 8 0.15 0.10 0.09 -0.22 -0.33 0.35 0.07 0.00 0.25 0.13 -0.07 1.00 
Source: OECD 2013, own representation 
Note: N=767 observations. Item 9 is not included, since it would decrease the number of cases by 521 due to 
missing values. 
Figure A1 Kernel density estimates of OECD EPLR index and new EPLR index 
 
Source: OECD 2013, own presentation 
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Figure A2 Change of EPLR within countries over time 
 
 
Source: OECD 2013, own presentation 
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Figure A3 Proportion of fixed-term contracts for new hires 
 
Source: EU-LFS 1992-2003, release 2017; own calculations; unweighted results. 
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Table A2 Descriptive statistics ESS 2004, 2010 
 Mean Min Max 
Fixed-term contract (FTC) 0.124 0 1 
Education    
ISCED 1-2 0.160 0 1 
ISCED 3-4 0.475 0 1 
ISCED 5-6 0.365 0 1 
”Easy to replace” 5.931  0 10 
Learning Period    
<2 days 0.032   
2-6 days 0.085 0 1 
1-4 weeks 0.164 0 1 
1-3 month 0.224 0 1 
3 month-1 year 0.287 0 1 
1-2 years 0.125 0 1 
2-5 years 0.065 0 1 
More than 5 years 0.018 0 1 
Age    
18-29 0.171 0 1 
30-39 0.264 0 1 
40-54 0.409 0 1 
55-67 0.156 0 1 
Part-time 0.169 0 1 
Female 0.494 0 1 
Child 0.498   
Unemployed in last 5 years 0.112 0 1 
Unemployed more than 12 month 0.088 0 1 
Company Size    
<10 0.215 0 1 
10-24 0.193 0 1 
25-99 0.267 0 1 
100-499 0.188 0 1 
>500 0.137 0 1 
Industry    
1 Agriculture 0.023 0 1 
2 Manufacturing Industry 0.176 0 1 
3 Construction 0.062 0 1 
4 Trade 0.112 0 1 
5 Transport/ Infrastructure 0.092 0 1 
6 Finance 0.037 0 1 
7 Public Administration 0.078 0 1 
8 Education 0.105 0 1 
9 Health sector 0.142 0 1 
10 Service 0.175 0 1 
 
  
32 GESIS Papers  2020|19 
Table A3 Descriptive statistics EWCS 2005, 2010, 2015 
 Mean Min Max 
Fixed-term contract (FTC) 0.113 0 1 
Education    
ISCED 1-2 0.183 0 1 
ISCED 3-4 0.463 0 1 
ISCED 5-6 0.353 0 1 
Age    
18-29 0.167 0 1 
30-39 0.266 0 1 
40-54 0.411 0 1 
55-67 0.155 0 1 
Part-time 0.151 0 1 
Female 0.513 0 1 
Company size    
<10 0.245 0 1 
10-49 0.330 0 1 
50-100 0.129 0 1 
100-499 0.184 0 1 
>500 0.113 0 1 
Industry    
1. A-B Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing 0.014 0 1 
2. C-D Mining, quarrying, manufacturing 0.154 0 1 
3. E Electricity, gas, and water supply 0.014 0 1 
4. F Construction 0.053 0 1 
5. G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehi-
cles and motorcycles 
0.139 0 1 
6. H Hotels and restaurants 0.033 0 1 
7. I Transport, storage, and communication 0.069 0 1 
8. J Financial intermediation 0.040 0 1 
9. K Real estate activities 0.092 0 1 
10. L Public administration and defense 0.082 0 1 
11. M-N-O-P-Q Other services 0.309 0 1 
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Table A4 Descriptive statistics EQLS 2007, 2012, 2016 
 Mean Min Max 
Fixed-Term-Contract (FTC) 0.124 0 1 
Education    
ISCED 1-2 0.194 0 1 
ISCED 3-4 0.460 0 1 
ISCED 5-6 0.346 0 1 
Age    
18-29 0.150 0 1 
30-39 0.270 0 1 
40-54 0.426 0 1 
55-67 0.154 0 1 
Part-time 0.138 0 1 
Female 0.519 0 1 
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Table A5 Effect of EPLR on Job Security (ESS 2004, 2010) 
 New EPLR index OECD EPLR index 
 beta se beta se 
Fixed-term contract (FTC) -0.173 (0.142) -0.249 (0.223) 
New EPLR index -0.006 (0.028)   
x FTC -0.060* (0.024)   
OECD EPLR index   -0.169* (0.066) 
x FTC   -0.015 (0.069) 
Reg. on temp. employment (Number and Duration) 0.103+ (0.055) 0.102* (0.050) 
x FTC  -0.075 (0.047) -0.088+ (0.052) 
Unemployment rate -0.001 (0.013) -0.001 (0.011) 
x FTC -0.015 (0.011) -0.013 (0.012) 
Education (Ref: ISCED 1-2)     
ISCED 3-4 -0.005 (0.020) -0.006 (0.020) 
ISCED 5-6 0.033 (0.021) 0.032 (0.021) 
“easy to replace” -0.029** (0.002) -0.029** (0.002) 
Learning period (Ref: <2days)     
2-6 days -0.016 (0.040) -0.016 (0.040) 
1-4 weeks 0.019 (0.038) 0.019 (0.038) 
1-3 month 0.028 (0.037) 0.028 (0.037) 
3 month-1 year 0.104** (0.037) 0.104** (0.037) 
1-2 years 0.126** (0.040) 0.125** (0.040) 
2-5 years 0.154** (0.043) 0.153** (0.043) 
More than 5 years 0.136* (0.058) 0.136* (0.058) 
Age (Ref.:18-29)     
30-39 -0.130** (0.020) -0.130** (0.020) 
40-54 -0.160** (0.019) -0.160** (0.019) 
55-67 -0.059** (0.022) -0.059** (0.022) 
Part-time 0.061** (0.018) 0.059** (0.018) 
Female -0.012 (0.014) -0.011 (0.014) 
Child 0.029* (0.013) 0.030* (0.013) 
Unemployed in last 5 years -0.255** (0.022) -0.256** (0.022) 
Unemployed more than 12 month -0.094** (0.023) -0.094** (0.023) 
Company size (Ref.:<10)     
10-24 -0.028 (0.019) -0.028 (0.019) 
25-99 -0.016 (0.018) -0.016 (0.018) 
100-499 0.002 (0.020) 0.002 (0.020) 
>500 0.024 (0.023) 0.024 (0.023) 
Industry (Ref.: service)     
1 Agriculture 0.079+ (0.044) 0.079+ (0.044) 
2 Manufacturing Industry -0.089** (0.022) -0.089** (0.022) 
3 Construction -0.042 (0.029) -0.042 (0.029) 
4 Trade -0.013 (0.024) -0.013 (0.024) 
5 Transport/ Infrastructure 0.030 (0.025) 0.030 (0.025) 
6 Finance -0.027 (0.035) -0.028 (0.035) 
7 Public Administration 0.280** (0.027) 0.281** (0.027) 
8 Education 0.296** (0.025) 0.296** (0.025) 
9 Health sector 0.230** (0.023) 0.230** (0.023) 
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Constant 2.938** (0.175) 3.323** (0.218) 
Variance components      
Random Slope (FTC) 0.050 (0.017) 0.064 (0.020) 
Country 0.085 (0.023) 0.069 (0.019) 
Individual 0.811 (0.008) 0.811 (0.008) 
Covariance (FTC, cons) -0.030 (0.015) -0.031 (0.015) 
Explained variance      
Random slope (FTC) 0.268  0.070  
R2 (Individual)a 0.109  0.124  
R2 (Country)a 0.199  0.368  
Country-years 32  32  
Individuals 21,836  21,836  
Note: + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01; Standard errors in parentheses. a R-squared as proposed by Snijders and 
Bosker (1999, pp. 99–105; 1994, pp. 350–354). 
Source: Estimations from the random intercept and random slope model (restricted maximum likelihood). 
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Table A6 Effect of EPLR on job security (EWCS 2005, 2010, 2015) 
 New EPLR index OECD EPLR index 
 beta se beta se 
Fixed-term contract (FTC) -0.259 (0.163) -0.126 (0.248) 
New EPLR index 0.041+ (0.022)   
x FTC -0.090** (0.026)   
OECD EPLR index   -0.115+ (0.064) 
x FTC   -0.113 (0.082) 
Regulation temp. employment 0.084+ (0.045) 0.108* (0.045) 
x FTC -0.165** (0.053) -0.188** (0.058) 
Unemployment rate -0.034** (0.009) -0.034** (0.009) 
x FTC -0.013 (0.011) -0.013 (0.012) 
Education 
ISCED 3-4 
0.071** (0.017) 0.070** (0.017) 
ISCED 5-6 0.170** (0.018) 0.168** (0.018) 
Age ( Ref.:18-29) 
30-39 
0.000 (0.018) 0.000 (0.018) 
40-54 0.010 (0.017) 0.010 (0.017) 
55-67 0.121** (0.021) 0.121** (0.021) 
Part-time -0.014 (0.017) -0.015 (0.017) 
Female 0.004 (0.013) 0.005 (0.013) 
Company size (Ref.: <10)     
10-49 0.078** (0.015) 0.078** (0.015) 
50-100 0.090** (0.020) 0.090** (0.020) 
100-499 0.096** (0.018) 0.095** (0.018) 
>500 0.142** (0.021) 0.141** (0.021) 
Industry (Ref.:10. L Public administration and defense) 
1. A-B Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing 
-0.278** (0.052) -0.278** (0.052) 
2. C-D Mining, quarrying, manufacturing -0.471** (0.025) -0.470** (0.025) 
3. E Electricity, gas, and water supply -0.240** (0.051) -0.240** (0.051) 
4. F Construction -0.437** (0.032) -0.437** (0.032) 
5. G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
-0.382** (0.026) -0.382** (0.026) 
6. H Hotels and restaurants -0.367** (0.037) -0.367** (0.037) 
7. I Transport, storage, and communication -0.383** (0.029) -0.383** (0.029) 
8. J Financial intermediation -0.295** (0.035) -0.294** (0.035) 
9. K Real estate activities -0.356** (0.027) -0.356** (0.027) 
11. M-N-O-P-Q Other services -0.083** (0.023) -0.083** (0.023) 
Constant 4.160** (0.144) 4.455** (0.197) 
Variance components      
Random Slope (FTC) 0.097 (0.024) 0.119 (0.028) 
Country 0.085 (0.017) 0.085 (0.017) 
Individual 1.217 (0.009) 1.217 (0.009) 
Covariance (FTC, cons) -0.043 (0.015) -0.062 (0.018) 
Explained variance      
Random slope 0.359  0.212  
R2 (Individual)a 0.129  0.131  
R2 (Country)a 0.446  0.474  
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Country-years 57  57  
Individuals 38426  38426  
Note: + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01; Standard errors in parentheses. a R-squared as proposed by Snijders and 
Bosker (1999, pp. 99–105; 1994, pp. 350–354). 
Source: Estimations from the random intercept and random slope model (restricted maximum likelihood). 
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Table A7 Effect of EPLR on job security (EQLS 2007, 2012, 2016) 
 New EPLR index OECD EPLR index 
 beta se beta Se 
Fixed-Term-Contract (FTC) -0.370** (0.109) -0.190 (0.188) 
New EPLR index 0.079** (0.022)   
x FTC -0.088** (0.018)   
OECD EPLR index   -0.072 (0.077) 
x FTC   -0.121+ (0.066) 
Reg. temp. employment (number & duration) -0.046 (0.045) -0.012 (0.051) 
x FTC -0.127** (0.037) -0.144** (0.044) 
Unemployment rate -0.030** (0.009) -0.027** (0.010) 
x FTC 0.005 (0.007) 0.001 (0.009) 
Education     
ISCED 3-4 0.073** (0.018) 0.072** (0.018) 
ISCED 5-6 0.227** (0.018) 0.225** (0.018) 
Age     
30-39 -0.014 (0.020) -0.013 (0.020) 
40-54 0.004 (0.019) 0.004 (0.019) 
55-67 0.095** (0.023) 0.095** (0.023) 
Part-time 0.003 (0.019) 0.003 (0.019) 
Female -0.006 (0.013) -0.006 (0.013) 
Constant 4.297** (0.138) 4.514** (0.221) 
Variance components      
Random Slope (FTC) 0.039 (0.012) 0.061 (0.016) 
Country 0.084 (0.017) 0.104 (0.021) 
Individual 0.974 (0.009) 0.974 (0.009) 
Covariance (FTC, cons) -0.021 (0.011) -0.049 (0.015) 
Explained variance      
Random slope 0.536  0.267  
R2 (Individual)a 0.106  0.094  
R2 (Country)a 0.381  0.288  
Country-years 55  55  
Individuals 26339  26339  
Note: + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01; Standard errors in parentheses. a R-squared as proposed by Snijders and 
Bosker (1999, pp. 99–105; 1994, pp. 350–354). 
Source: Estimations from the random intercept and random slope model (restricted maximum likelihood). 
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Table A8 Effect of EPLR on temporary employment risk of new hires (extended) 
 New EPLR index OECD EPLR index New EPLR index 
(z-stnd.) 
OECD EPLR index 
(z-stnd.) 
 beta se beta se beta se beta se 
New EPLR index 0.032** (0.005)       
OECD EPLR index   0.111** (0.012)     
New EPLR index (z-
stnd.) 
    0.057** (0.009)   
OECD EPLR index (z-
stnd.) 
      0.064** (0.007) 
Duration of trial period 
(short) 
0.074** (0.020) 0.026 (0.020) 0.074** (0.020) 0.026 (0.020) 
Regulations on the use 
of temporary contracts 
-0.007 (0.006) 0.003 (0.005) -0.007 (0.006) 0.003 (0.005) 
Unemployment rate 0.022** (0.002) 0.025** (0.002) 0.022** (0.002) 0.025** (0.002) 
Age (Ref.:<20)         
20-29 -0.024** (0.001) -0.024** (0.001) -0.024** (0.001) -0.024** (0.001) 
30-39 -0.081** (0.002) -0.081** (0.002) -0.081** (0.002) -0.081** (0.002) 
40-49 -0.063** (0.002) -0.063** (0.002) -0.063** (0.002) -0.063** (0.002) 
50-59 -0.058** (0.002) -0.058** (0.002) -0.058** (0.002) -0.058** (0.002) 
60-69 0.013** (0.002) 0.013** (0.002) 0.013** (0.002) 0.013** (0.002) 
>70 0.000 (0.005) 0.000 (0.005) 0.000 (0.005) 0.000 (0.005) 
Education (Ref. low)         
middle -0.018** (0.001) -0.018** (0.001) -0.018** (0.001) -0.018** (0.001) 
high -0.014** (0.001) -0.014** (0.001) -0.014** (0.001) -0.014** (0.001) 
Female -0.010** (0.001) -0.010** (0.001) -0.010** (0.001) -0.010** (0.001) 
Variance components         
 Individual 0.207 (0.000) 0.207 (0.000) 0.207 (0.000) 0.207 (0.000) 
 Country 0.023 (0.002) 0.020 (0.002) 0.023 (0.002) 0.020 (0.002) 
Explained variance         
 Individual 0.069  0.081  0.069  0.081  
 Country 0.410  0.485  0.410  0.485  
Country-years 304  304  304  304  
Individuals 1242199  1242199  1242199  1242199  
Note: + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01; Standard errors in parentheses. R-squared as proposed by Snijders and 
Bosker (1999, pp. 99–105; 1994, pp. 350–354).  
Source: Estimations from the random intercept model (restricted maximum likelihood). 
